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Foreword
European Union countries spend more 
than 1 trillion Euros a year on providing 
healthcare for their citizens. This Report 
shows that 56 billion Euros of these 
healthcare budgets are lost to fraud in 
Europe annually and 180 billion Euros 
globally. The European Healthcare Fraud 
and Corruption Network (EHFCN) exists to 
help European healthcare organisations 
identify and reduce these losses so that 
more money can be better spent on patient 
care; similar Networks exist in the United 
States, and Canada and counterparts are 
being created in other continents. 
 
Europe is a big place and there are certainly 
differences between us - differences in the 
size of our countries; differences in politics; 
differences in economies and differences 
in healthcare systems. However, whether 
we come from Lisbon or Vilnius, Oslo or 
Nicosia, what we all have in common is that 
we want and need to be healthy. 
 
We have healthy people who fear ill health, 
sick people who yearn to be well, old people 
who want to enjoy their later years and 
young people who need the foundations of 
life long good health. 
 
Unfortunately we also have a fraudulent or 
corrupt minority who is prepared to divert 
or misuse funds which are intended to keep 
us all well. Let’s not pretend, this minority 
exists in all our countries. No country 
is immune and none of us can afford to 
pretend that we have no healthcare fraud. 
 
Every cent lost drains the lifeblood from our 
healthcare systems and undermines their 
capacity to provide essential treatment. 
We need to join together and mobilise the 
honest majority, we need to do this across 
Europe and we need to do it urgently.  
 
There are three main reasons why we 
need to work together. Firstly, wherever 
a problem arises we can all learn from 
it together rather than the same lesson 
being learnt many times in different 
countries; secondly, by agreeing common 
high standards for countering fraud and 
corruption in healthcare we can make sure 
that no-one is in any doubt about what 
action is required for success; and thirdly, 
we can support each other. None of us have 
this problem beaten but those who have 
progressed furthest can help those with the 
furthest to go. 
 
In this work every Euro lost to fraud or 
corruption means that someone, somewhere 
is not getting the treatment that they need. 
They are ill for longer, and in some cases 
they simply die unnecessarily. Make no 
mistake - healthcare fraud is a killer. 
 
There is no time to waste. This Report 
provides credible, accurate information 
about the financial cost of healthcare fraud. 
We need to join together to tackle this 
destructive problem. 
Paul Vincke 
President 
European Healthcare Fraud and  
Corruption Network
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In November 2009, Maclntyre Hudson LLP 
and the Centre for Counter Fraud Studies 
at University of Portsmouth published, for 
the first time, an in-depth ‘Financial Cost of 
Fraud’ Report1 collating the latest, accurate, 
statistically valid information from around the 
world about the real financial cost of fraud 
and error.
 
That Report considered and analysed 
132 exercises to measure losses to fraud 
(and error) which have been undertaken 
around the world during the last ten 
years. The exercises were implemented 
across 32 types of expenditure, to 
accurately measure the financial cost 
resulting from fraud and error. 
66 of those exercises measured losses in 
healthcare organisations and this Report 
undertakes a further analysis in this specific 
area. The reasons for and basis of this work 
were clearly stated in ‘The Financial Cost of 
Fraud’ Report, however, it is important to 
restate them here. 
 
What is fraud?
The measurement of losses to fraud 
(and error) is an essential first step to 
successful action. Once the extent of fraud 
losses is known then they can be treated 
like any other business cost – something 
to be reduced and minimised in the 
best interest of the financial health and 
stability of the organisation concerned. It 
becomes possible to go beyond reacting 
to unforeseen individual instances of fraud 
and to include plans to pre-empt and 
minimise fraud losses in business plans. 
The Report doesn’t just look at detected 
fraud or the individual cases which have 
come to light and been prosecuted. 
Because there is no crime which has a 100% 
detection rate, adding together detected 
fraud significantly underestimates the 
problem. It is also the case that if detected 
fraud losses go up, does that mean that 
there is more fraud or that there has been 
better detection; equally, if detected fraud 
losses fall, does that mean that there is less 
fraud or worse detection? 
 
1‘The Financial Cost of Fraud’ Report 2006
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The starting point for civil law definitions 
of fraud is the case of Derry v. Peek 1889 
(UK House of Lords). Here, Lord Herschell, 
giving judgement on the case, defined 
‘fraud’ to include a false statement “made 
knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or 
recklessly, careless whether it be true or 
false”. 
 
This definition covers a number of 
possibilities, ranging from where:
a person admits knowledge that a •	
statement is untrue (through to...)
where it can be demonstrated from •	
evidence that they knew the statement 
to be untrue (even if this is not admitted) 
(through to)
where it can be demonstrated from •	
evidence that they did not care whether 
the statement was true or untrue - or 
in other words, that they knew it was 
possible that the statement might be 
untrue 
In 2005 the Swiss Institute of Comparative 
Law provided the following definition, which 
broadly follows the UK law: 
 
“Civil fraud is the use or presentation of 
false, incorrect or incomplete statements 
and/or documents, or the non-disclosure 
of information in violation of a legally 
enforceable obligation to disclose, having 
as its effect the misappropriation or 
wrongful retention of funds or property of 
others, or their misuse for purposes other 
than those specified”. 
 
Where error has been measured in the 
exercises reviewed in this Report, this is 
non-medical internal or external ‘error’ 
which has resulted in incorrect expenditure. 
The Report also doesn’t rely on survey-
based information where those involved 
are asked for their opinions about the level 
of fraud. These tend to vary significantly 
according to the perceived seriousness of 
the problem at the time by those surveyed. 
While they sometimes represent a valid 
survey of opinion, that is very different from 
a valid survey of losses.  
 
The financial and economic damage 
resulting from fraud (and error) is surely 
the worst aspect of the problem. Yes, fraud 
is unethical, immoral and unlawful; yes, 
the individuals who are proven to have 
been involved should be punished; yes, 
the sums lost to fraud need to be traced 
and recovered. However, these are actions 
which take place after the fraud losses have 
happened – after the resources have been 
diverted from where they were intended 
and after the economic damage has 
occurred. 
 
Fraud as a business cost  
 
In almost every other area of business 
life, organisations know what their costs 
are – staffing costs, accommodation costs, 
utility costs, procurement costs and many 
others. For centuries, these costs have 
been assessed and reviewed and measures 
have been developed to pre-empt them 
and improve efficiency. This incremental 
process now often delivers quite small 
additional improvements. 
Fraud and error costs, on the other hand, 
have only very rarely had the same focus. 
The common position has been that 
organisations have either denied that they 
had any fraud or planned only to react 
after fraud has taken place. Because of this, 
fraud is now one of the great unreduced 
business costs. 
However, a cost can only be reduced if it 
can be measured, and a methodology to do 
this accurately has only been developed and 
implemented over the last decade.
Now that we can measure fraud and error 
losses, we can make proper judgements 
about the level of investment to be made in 
reducing them. Now that we can measure 
these losses, we can measure the financial 
benefits resulting from their reduction. 
 
The size of the prize  
 
In the current macro-economic climate, 
reducing these losses are one of the 
least painful ways of reducing costs. This 
Report identifies what the financial cost 
of healthcare fraud and error has been 
found to be and thus, the ‘size of the prize’ 
to be achieved from reducing them.
Of course, there is always more research 
to be done and any organisation should 
consider what its own fraud and error 
costs are likely to be, however, the 
volume of data which is already available 
from exercises covering over £300 
billion, points clearly to losses usually 
being found in the range of 3-8%.
We will continue to monitor data as 
it becomes available and publish 
further Reports as appropriate.
Jim Gee
Director of Counter Fraud Services,
Maclntyre Hudson LLP and Chair of 
the Centre for Counter Fraud Studies
This Report has reviewed 69 exercises, 
to accurately measure healthcare fraud 
and error losses, undertaken in 33 
organisations from 6 countries. 66 of those 
exercises were successfully completed 
covering expenditure totalling over £300 
billion. The value of the expenditure 
examined has not been uprated to 2009 
values.
It is important to be clear about the basis 
for this Report. It is based on extensive 
global research, building on previously 
established direct knowledge, to collate 
information about relevant exercises. The 
data was then analysed electronically. 
Exercises were considered from Europe, 
North America and Australia and New 
Zealand. None were found in Asia or Africa.
The Report has excluded guesstimates, 
figures derived from detected fraud losses, 
and figures resulting from surveys of 
opinion. It has also excluded some loss 
measurement exercises where it is clear 
that they have not met the standards 
described below. 
 
Statistically valid
It has included exercises which:
have considered a statistically valid •	
sample of income or expenditure
have sought and examined •	
information indicating the presence 
of fraud, error or correctness in 
each case within that sample
have been completed and reported•	
have been externally validated•	
have a measurable level of •	
statistical confidence
have a measurable level of accuracy.•	
However, there are a number of caveats. 
Some of the exercises have resulted 
in estimates of the healthcare fraud 
frequency rate, some of the percentage of 
expenditure lost to healthcare fraud, and 
some have measured both. 
 
It is also the case that, some exercises have 
separately identified measured healthcare 
fraud and error and some have not. 
 
In some cases, there have been repeated 
exercises to measure fraud and error 
losses in a single area of expenditure. 
To avoid skewing the overall results by 
including a disproportionate quantity of 
data from one source, only the results 
from the first and most recent exercises 
have been included. In most of these 
instances, fraud and error losses have 
been significantly reduced since the initial 
measurement exercises 
 
Transparency is a key factor 
 
Sometimes, once such exercises have been 
completed, the organisations concerned 
have, mistakenly in the view of the authors 
of this Report, decided not to publish 
their results. Transparency about the 
scale of the problem is a key factor in its 
solution, because attention can be focused 
and a proportionate investment made.
In some cases, those directly involved 
in countering fraud have decided, 
confidentially, to provide information 
about unpublished exercises for wider 
consideration. In those cases, while 
the overall figures have been included 
in the findings of this Report, no 
specific reference has been made to the 
organisations concerned. 
 
The authors of this Report are also aware 
of a very small number of other exercises 
which have been completed, but which 
have not been published and where 
nothing is known of the findings. 
Finally, it is important to emphasise that 
this research will never be complete. 
More evidence becomes available each 
year. However, the preponderance of 
the evidence does point clearly in one 
direction, as is explained later. 
 
While it is necessary to make these caveats 
clear, the importance of the evidence 
collated in this Report should not be 
underestimated. The evidence shows 
healthcare fraud and error losses can be 
measured – they have been successfully 
measured many times, in many different 
organisations and across the world. 
 
However, even more important is that the 
evidence shows that losses to healthcare 
fraud and error are significant and 
seriously undermine the quality and extent 
of patient care which can be provided.
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The six countries in which the authors are 
aware that fraud loss analysis exercises 
have taken place are:
the UK•	
the United States•	
France•	
Belgium•	
the Netherlands•	
New Zealand.•	
By value of income or expenditure 
measured, the United States has 
undertaken the greatest amount of work 
in this area. This is a direct reflection of 
the Improper Payments Information Act 
of 2002 (IPIA) which requires designated 
major U.S. public authorities to estimate 
the annual amount of payments made 
where fraud and error are present, and to 
report the estimates to the President and 
Congress with a progress report on actions 
to reduce them.
The guidance relating to the IPIA states 
“The estimates shall be based on the 
equivalent of a statistical random sample 
with a precision requiring a sample of 
sufficient size to yield an estimate with a 
90% confidence interval of plus or minus 
2.5%”². Many U.S. agencies undertake work 
to the higher standard often found in the 
UK and Europe – 95% statistical confidence 
and +or- 1%. 
 
A growing understanding
In other countries, while there has not 
hitherto been any legal requirement, 
there is a growing understanding that 
the key to successful loss reduction is 
to understand the nature and scale of 
the problem. For example, in Europe, 
the European Healthcare Fraud and 
Corruption Declaration of 2004, agreed by 
organisations from 28 countries called for 
“The development of a European common 
standard of risk measurement, with annual 
statistically valid follow up exercises to 
measure progress in reducing losses to 
fraud and corruption throughout the EU.”³  
 
The range of types of income and 
expenditure where losses have 
been measured include fraud (and 
error) involving patients, healthcare 
professionals, staff and managers, and 
contractors. 
 
The specific areas where losses have been 
measured include:
the fraudulent provision of •	
sickness certificates
prescription fraud by pharmacists•	
prescription fraud by patients•	
fraud and error concerning capitation •	
payments to general practitioners
fraud and error concerning •	
payments made to doctors to 
manage a patients medical care
the evasion of dental •	
charges by patients
fraud and error by opticians concerning •	
the provision of sight tests
fraud and error concerning employees •	
of healthcare organisations
fraud and error concerning payments •	
for in-patient hospital services
fraud and error concerning •	
long term care
fraud and error concerning home •	
and community based services
fraud and error concerning the •	
provision of services and supplies
fraud and error concerning health •	
insurance for children. 
The data which has been analysed
2Appendix C to Office of Management and 
Budget Circular A-123 
 
3European Healthcare Fraud and Corruption 
Declaration 2004 
Two types of figures have been produced:
a percentage loss rate (PLR - i.e. •	
the proportion of expenditure 
lost to fraud and error)
a fraud frequency rate (FFR - i.e. •	
frequency of fraud and error)
The same exercise can produce different 
PLR and FFR figures. For example, one 
hundred items of expenditure out of a 
thousand worth £100,000 might be found 
to be fraudulent. This would produce 
an FFR of 10%. However, the particular 
ten items might have a value of £12,000 
producing a PLR of 12%.  
 
The items of expenditure where fraud is 
found to be present may be either greater 
or less than the average value of all of 
the items of expenditure. For example, it 
may be that fraud tends to affect items 
of expenditure that are higher than the 
average value – this will result in the PLR 
being higher than the FFR. Indeed, to some 
extent the findings of this research, in 
general, show just that. 
 
There is more research still to be done 
and it is intended that this Report will 
be updated on a regular basis.
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The range of percentage losses (PLR) was 
found to be between 3.29% and 10.00% 
with an average PLR of 5.59%.
All of the PLR figures were more than 3% 
with more than one fifth showing losses of 
more than 8%.
. 
Healthcare fraud and error losses
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The range of fraud frequency rates 
(FFR) was found to be between 0.47 and 
7.1% with an average FFR of 4.23%.
92% of the exercises showed FFR 
figures of between 3% and 8%.
On the basis of the evidence, it is clear 
that healthcare fraud and error losses 
in any organisation should currently be 
expected to be at least 3%, probably more 
than 5% and possibly as much as 10%.  
Separate research, analysing 28 key aspects 
of counter fraud arrangements across many 
organisations, continues. By combining 
the data which underpins this report and 
organisation-specific information about 
counter fraud arrangements, MacIntyre 
Hudson is able, for the first time, to 
predict the likely scale of losses, the 
key improvements which would reduce 
them and the related cost, for client 
organisations. 
 
You can go to the webpage to get a free 
prediction concerning the likely scale of 
losses in your organisation at either. 
 
www.macintyrehudson.co.uk/services/
counter_fraud.html 
 
or 
 
www.ehfcn.org
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This Report, for the first time, publishes 
accurate information about the extent of 
losses to healthcare fraud and error. It 
proves that it is possible to measure the 
nature and extent of the problem. It may 
be embarrassing for some organisations to 
find out just how much they are losing but 
it is possible to do this. 
 
Because of the direct, negative impact on 
human life of healthcare losses, it is never 
easy to admit they take place. However, the 
first step to reducing losses is to stop being 
in denial about them. If an organisation 
is not aware of the extent or nature of its 
losses, how can it apply the right solution 
and reduce them? 
 
Where losses have been measured, 
and the organisations concerned have 
accurate information about their nature 
and extent, there are examples where 
losses have been substantially reduced. 
These include the UK’s National Health 
Service (the second largest organisation 
in the world) between 1999 and 2006 
where losses were reduced by up to 60%, 
and by up to 40% over a shorter period4.
Three things are clear:
losses to healthcare fraud and error can •	
be measured – and cost effectively;
on the basis of the evidence it is •	
likely that losses in any healthcare 
organisation and any area of 
expenditure will be at least 3%, 
probably more than 5% and 
possibly as much as 10%;
and with the benefit of accurate •	
information about their nature and 
extent, they can be reduced significantly. 
This Report shows just how much is 
being lost. The average loss found, 
across such a wide range of healthcare 
expenditure, was 5.59%. The World Health 
Organisation’s latest estimate of global 
healthcare expenditure is US$4.7 trillion 
(3.3 trillion Euros or £2.9 trillion). 
Thus, it is likely that around 180 billion 
Euros (£160 billion or US$260 billion) is 
lost globally to fraud (and error). This is 
the equivalent of one and a half times the 
budget for the entire UK NHS or enough to 
build more than 1,500 new hospitals (at 
developed world prices) and more than the 
entire national GDP of 157 of the world’s 
195 countries. 
 
Countering fraud effectively would reduce 
these losses and free up massive resources 
for better patient care. The authors of this 
Report hope that it focuses attention on 
this problem and the potential benefits 
to be derived from starting to solve it.
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Conclusion
4 UK NHS Counter Fraud and Security 
Management Service – 1999 – 2006 
Performance Statistics 
Examples of healthcare fraud 
 
Below are some examples from across the 
world of healthcare fraud: 
 
Fraud by managers and staff
• Payroll fraud: Managers or staff 
employed by healthcare providing 
organisations (public or private health 
insurers, national health funds, etc.) 
obtaining employment or advancing 
their careers by claiming false 
employment histories or qualifications;
• Misdirection of resources: One finance 
manager was found to have placed their 
family on the payroll of the healthcare 
organisation that they worked for;
• Personal impropriety: One Chief Executive 
Officer of a healthcare organisation 
was found to have overclaimed on his 
mileage allowance by 55,000 miles;
• Hospitals: Hospitals have been 
found to falsely claim that they have 
undertaken surgical procedures 
to attract extra payments.
Fraud by healthcare professionals
• Doctors: Two doctors were found to have 
claimed a Government improvement 
grant for their surgery and to have 
subsequently spent the money on 
creating a car import/export business; 
• Doctors: It was reported from Taiwan that 
three doctors who admitted to conspiring 
with patients to defraud insurance 
companies of almost NT$80 million 
have had their licenses revoked for the 
first time in Taiwan’s medical history. A 
syndicate of medical personnel had been 
falsely diagnosing patients with cancer 
– going as far as performing breast 
removal surgeries and chemotherapy 
in disease-free bodies – since 2003 
to file multiple insurance claims;
• Dentists: Dentists have been found to 
have claimed for dental work which has 
not been undertaken; to have claimed for 
gold fillings which were actually mostly 
composed of nickel; and to have claimed 
fees for re-opening their surgeries out of 
normal hours without actually doing this;
• Opticians: Opticians have been found to 
have claimed fees for undertaking sight 
tests on people who were subsequently 
found to have been dead or non-existent; 
or to have been paid for providing 
replacement glasses without doing so;
• Pharmacists: Pharmacists have been 
found to deliberately divide up 
prescriptions into small packages 
in order to claim additional fees.
Fraud by the public and patients
• Organised criminals: criminals have been 
found to establish bogus medical clinics 
in order to bill insurers for healthcare 
treatments that were never provided 
and to have stolen confidential patient 
data for use in credit card fraud;
• Patients: Patients have been found to lie 
about their economic circumstances in 
order to obtain free healthcare treatment, 
to pretend that they are resident in 
particular countries where they were 
entitled to free treatment and to claim 
expenses for journeys to hospital which 
they never made; 
Fraud by contractors and suppliers
• Pfizer Inc., the drugs giant, was 
ordered to pay $2.3 billion in America’s 
largest healthcare fraud settlement, 
for making false claims about 
four prescription medications. 11 
whistleblowers became so concerned 
that the company was asking them to 
break the law and mis-sell the drugs 
that they informed the authorities; 
• Drug companies: Drug companies 
have been found to organise cartels to 
restrict the supply of key drugs and to 
artificially raise the price; they have also 
been found paying bribes to medical 
professionals to prescribe their drugs;
• Equipment companies have been 
found to supply counterfeit diagnostic 
equipment and there is a serious 
global problem concerning the 
supply of counterfeit drugs.
It should be emphasised that there is a 
vast honest majority of managers, staff, 
professionals, patients and contractors 
but the dishonest minority causes  
significant financial losses which have 
a serious effect on the quality of patient 
care.
The financial cost of healthcare fraud/13
Appendix 1
The financial cost of healthcare fraud/14
Jim Gee is Director of Counter Fraud 
Services at Maclntyre Hudson LLP and 
Chair of the Centre for Counter Fraud 
Studies
Jim Gee is one of the leading counter fraud 
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About MacIntyre Hudson LLP
Established in 1880, we are a growing 
and successful mid tier UK independent 
accountancy firm working with 
entrepreneurial businesses, groups and 
multinationals with operations in the UK.
We provide a comprehensive range of 
services and specialist advice, including 
audit and assurance, tax planning and 
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business strategy, counter fraud services and 
outsourcing. Other parts of the MacIntyre 
Hudson Group provide specialist advice on 
corporate finance and professional training.
www.macintyrehudson.co.uk
Our membership of CPA Associates 
International Inc. provides multiple 
benefits to our clients. CPAAI is among the 
world’s largest international accountancy 
associations with member firms in major 
business centres around the world. Through 
CPAAI we can offer our clients access to 
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With ten offices in the UK and associates in 
most of the major cities in Europe, the Middle 
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The Centre for Counter Fraud Studies
The University of Portsmouth’s Centre for 
Counter Fraud Studies (CCFS) was founded 
in June 2009 and is one of the specialist 
research centres in the University’s Institute 
of Criminal Justice Studies. It was founded 
to establish better understanding of fraud 
and how to combat it through rigorous 
research. The Institute of Criminal Justice 
Studies is home to researchers from a wide 
cross-section of disciplines and provides a 
clear focus for research, knowledge transfer 
and educational provision to the counter 
fraud community. The Centre for Counter 
Fraud Studies makes its independent 
research findings available to support those 
working in counter fraud by providing 
the latest and best information on the 
effectiveness of counter fraud strategies.
www.port.ac.uk/departments/academic/icjs/
CentreforCounterFraudStudies/ 
 
The European Healthcare Fraud 
and Corruption Network
The European Healthcare Fraud and 
Corruption Network (EHFCN) exists to 
help its members combat fraud and 
corruption in the healthcare sector across 
Europe. Its aim is to assist in improving 
European healthcare systems by reducing 
losses to fraud and corruption. 
EHFCN provides information, tools, 
training and assistance in fighting fraud 
and corruption as well as a platform for 
its members to exchange information and 
ideas. The Network also aims to collaborate 
with European and international bodies who 
have an influence on healthcare in Europe, 
such as the European Union, Council of 
Europe, and the World Health Organisation.
EHFCN is a non-profit organisation financed 
through subscription fees. Its members are 
healthcare and counter fraud organisations 
form across Europe.  
 
www.ehfcn.org 
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